Opinion | The (In)Efficacy of Military-Style Academies

Written by Riley Parnwell

As the Oranga Tamariki (Responding to Serious Youth Offending) Amendment Bill sits before Parliament, Oranga Tamariki has run a pilot programme for New Zealand’s latest iteration of boot camps. In my previous article, ‘The Return of Boot Camps: Background to MSAs’, I explained how evidence indicates MSAs will not be successful. This article substantiates that conclusion by breaking down the evaluation reports to assess the pilot’s lack of impact. While the pilot may not exactly reflect future real MSAs, it was designed as a close model (Cabinet, 2024, [33]). I end by explaining why policies like boot camps are nonetheless used.

The Pilot Programme

Following a clinical assessment, the pilot programme spanned residence and community stages. The residence stage saw the young people spend three months in Te Au rere a te Tonga, a youth justice facility buried in an industrial estate in Palmerston North. Three months is the minimum period for the residence stage under the bill, per proposed section 320S. Given the statutory basis does not yet exist, all participants had to agree to be involved and have the programme incorporated into their Youth Court plans (Malatest International, 2024, p. 33). The nine-month reintegration-focused community stage took place following release from the residence.

Demographics

There were several commonalities in the pilot cohort (Malatest International, 2024, p. 36). All were male, all were Māori, and almost all were 17. All had been remanded multiple times. None were still engaged in conventional schooling, all but one had a history of alcohol, cannabis or methamphetamine use, several had severe mental health difficulties, including suicidality, and all were survivors of abuse or the subject of reports of abuse. This is, plainly, a group with complex needs who deserve a nuanced and evidenced response. With Oranga Tamariki predicting 84 per cent of young people who will pass through MSAs will be Māori (Malatest International 2024, p. 2), a culturally reflective response also seems necessary.

Daily Schedule

The pilot cohort was housed in a wing kept separate from the other young people in Te Au rere a te Tonga, who were on other existing youth justice orders. They were kept in the wing which typically housed girls, and it is not clear where they were shifted. The greatest detail on day-to-day activities comes from the first evaluation report (Malatest International, 2024, p. 38). It sets out the time spent on each category of activity as follows:

• A ‘structured routine’ – 25%.

• Military-style training – 22%.

• Mental health – 17%.

• Education – 11%.

• Preparation for transition – 10%.

• Inclusion of whānau – 8%.

• Cultural education – 4%.

• Community service – 3%.

An infographic prepared by Oranga Tamariki is then used to explain what a “typical day” looks like in an MSA. It describes a 06:30 wake-up, breakfast, two periods of education and two periods of physical activity, followed by lunch. The afternoon involves four more periods of cultural connection or wellbeing activities, before a guest speaker or community transition session. The cohort has one hour of downtime following dinner. 

This breakdown, however, is not helpful. It is unlikely to reflect what happened during the pilot as elements of the programme were individualised. While Oranga Tamariki did provide further information following a request under the Official Information Act, including a brief explanation of the ‘morning routine’ and ‘evening routine’ the young people undertook each day, significant detail was withheld on the basis it had to protect commercial negotiations with providers for the future MSAs (Oranga Tamariki, 2025(b)).

The Military and Therapeutic Components

Bits and pieces can nonetheless be gathered from the rest of the evaluation report. Physical activity appears to have been a mix of typical sport or gym sessions – including rugby and circuit training (Oranga Tamariki, 2025(b)) – with military-style drills, marching, and a confidence course. The cohort had to wear a uniform consisting of four outfits: khaki shirts and pants, a set of casual clothes, gym wear, and wet-weather clothing. Oranga Tamariki kaimahi considered the structure provided by these elements had a positive effect compared to youth justice facilities they had previously worked in (Malatest International, 2024, p. 44). 

Clinical staff describe the therapeutic work within the pilot as unique for youth justice in New Zealand (Malatest International, 2024, p. 40). It involved emotional and impulse regulation work as well as drug and alcohol rehabilitation, supported by doctors’ visits and dental appointments for the physical health of the young people. But while Oranga Tamariki intended to run individual and group sessions throughout the programme, individual work was almost immediately stopped due to a lack of staffing. 

Poor Staffing

Staffing concerns run deeper, however. Poor planning appears to have inhibited the performance of kaimahi. They found their secondment in Palmerston North, lasting more than three months following training at a South Island Defence Force base, to be unsustainable. Failure to clearly define roles led to extended working hours, a need to improvise in an already difficult environment, and certain clinical staff being left to perform “critical components” alone (Malatest International, 2024, p. 6). Planning of the pilot itself was disrupted by an earlier restructuring of Oranga Tamariki, following the cuts made to the public sector.

Education

Another underwhelming element was the education offered within the pilot programme. Oranga Tamariki brought in an external tutor for individual sessions. While this resulted in better outcomes than the emphasis on group work in other youth justice facilities, they spent less time learning than usual. Given the entire pilot cohort had already disengaged with standard schooling, they would likely have found greater benefit from better vocational education and transitional help to ease life back in the community.

Effects of the Pilot Programme

Anecdotal Evidence from the Community Stage

While kaimahi praised the therapeutic aspect of the pilot, anecdotes indicate it was not without detriment. The second evaluation report says “[s]ome” in the cohort resumed use of alcohol and other drugs when back in the community (Tiria, 2025, p. 20). Where Oranga Tamariki assessed boys as capable of work, it made some attempts to find employment for them. One boy began working in the trades sector, connecting utilities to new houses. Despite being promised he would be able to “sign a contract” in the coming weeks (Tiria, 2025, p. 22), he was let go when his employer decided there was not enough work. His social worker explained that the sudden loss of the pride he gained from work was such a blow to his sense of self that he relapsed and began using methamphetamine again. The lack of a certain and steady opportunity for the boy allowed a gap that stunted his progress. 

In speaking with the independent evaluator, another participant said his mind is “just f**ked up”, that he does not know “how to think properly”, and that he was “just too used to” youth justice facilities (Tiria, 2025, p. 20). Predictably, 12 weeks of support was not enough to break the harmful patterns these boys face. At a broader level, the positive reflections of Oranga Tamariki kaimahi are in conflict with the overall statistics from the pilot. Oranga Tamariki interprets success as a “small number” not yet returning to a youth justice residence, and lower severity where participants have reoffended (Tiria, 2025, p. 29). But the boys only spent about six weeks longer in the community before breaching release conditions or allegedly reoffending, doing so at a rate of 80 per cent nine months after release (Oranga Tamariki, 2025). The figure for those released from youth justice facilities following supervision with residence orders is approximately the same. Put plainly, nothing has been achieved.  

If Evidence Pointed Against It, Why Were Boot Camps Used?

A report on youth justice by then-Chief Science Advisor, Sir Ian Lambie, explains that understanding young offending “in context” of the hardship they face enables both an evidence-driven policy response and a more “empathetic” public reaction (Ian Lambie et al., 2022, p. 154). Instead, the Government opted for a programme that foregrounds the behaviour of these young people and strips it of any context. Instead of placing rehabilitation and “sociostructural factors” (Ian Lambie et al., 2022, p. 154) like abuse and disassociation with culture at the centre, the choice was made to continue the siloed response to young offending and create an environment that does a better job of comforting a political majority (1News, 2022) than helping the young people involved. The Government’s choice entrenches the social view that these young people are deviant and therefore deserving of punishment. But it is not just a random assortment of young people that will be sent to MSAs. It is mostly socioeconomically deprived young Māori. A critical view of MSAs would therefore argue – as the Māori Lawyers Association did – that they send the message that “those who are poor and/or brown” must be contained and are “in need” of a justice response (Te Hunga Rōia Māori o Aotearoa, 2024, at [10]).

Boot camps like the MSAs may be viewed as an example of penal populism. Populism is the servicing of a group that has supposedly been “ignored” by a government, or successive governments, at the expense of an undeserving out-group (Pratt, 2007, p. 9). Politicians can use the designated out-group as a scapegoat to create or exacerbate fear among the populace. Penal populism is the application of populist politics to the generally fearful and punitive public stance on criminal justice. Polling has shown two-thirds of New Zealanders felt less safe before the 2023 election than they did five years earlier (Gabel, 2023). By claiming they would “restore law and order” during the campaign, the National Party tapped into that insecurity (New Zealand National Party, 2023, p. 2). Policies like MSAs allow a framing that action is being taken. Indeed, there was a significant boost in the proportion of New Zealanders who felt safe following the pilot programme (Dexter, 2025). This correlation results in greater political support while the policy problem is ignored.

Conclusion

In my previous article, I explained the evidence which shows boot camps do not help young people change their offending. Though we lack information on the day-to-day activities in the pilot programme, the evaluation reports show that it compounds the existing body of experimental evidence. There are serious concerns that the bill targets a narrow, racialised group and fails to properly engage with the policy problem presented by serious and repeated young offending.

References

Dexter, G. (2025, April 4). About a quarter of people feel more safe than a year ago – poll. Radio New Zealand. https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/557002/about-a-quarter-of-people-feel-more-safe-than-a-year-ago-poll.

Gabel, J. (2023, June 3). New poll on crime and safety shows New Zealanders feel less safe today than five years ago. New Zealand Herald. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/new-poll-on-crime-and-safety-shows-new-zealanders-feel-less-safe-today-than-five-years-ago/DXBW3YNE4FCG7MLPY7WMDHHJZM/.

Malatest International. 2024. Evaluation of the Military-Style Academy pilot: Assessment and residential phases. https://www.orangatamariki.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Youth-justice/Military-Style-Academies/Reports-and-Briefings/OT-MSA-residence-stage-preliminary-evaluation.pdf. 

New Zealand Government. (2024, June 10). Military-Style Academy Pilot: The Approach (CAB-24-MIN-0209).

New Zealand National Party. (2023). Restoring law and order (Policy document).

Oranga Tamariki. (2025a). Military-Style Academy pilot concludes. www.orangatamariki.govt.nz/about-us/news/military-style-academy-pilot-ends/.

Oranga Tamariki. 2025(b). Revised response to request for “Further detail of activities undertaken by participants in Military-Style Academy trial programme” (Obtained through Official Information Act 1982 Request to Oranga Tamariki). 

Poll: Majority support boot camps for serious youth offenders. (2022, December 8). 1News. https://www.1news.co.nz/2022/12/08/poll-majority-support-boot-camps-for-serious-youth-offenders/.   

Pratt, J. 2007. Penal Populism. Routledge, Abingdon. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203963678.

Te Hunga Rōia Māori o Aotearoa. (2024). Submission to the Social Services and Community Committee on the Oranga Tamariki (Responding to Serious Youth Offending) Amendment Bill 2024.

Tiria (previously Malatest International). (2025). Second preliminary evaluation report: Military Style Academy Pilot. https://www.orangatamariki.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Youth-justice/Military-Style-Academies/Reports-and-Briefings/MSA-pilot-Community-phase-report-2.pdf.